Appendix to: An Agency Perspective On Immigration Federalism

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A A Model of Collaborative Policymaking in a Federated System

I model a collaborative policymaking process in which a federal government and subnational governments may each contribute policy inputs, and an output is generated by a production function. Each of the governments has single-peaked preferences defined over the outputs. I am interested in how the outcomes and utilities realized under this regime compare to an alternative regime of centralized control, in which federal authorities unilaterally set policy in all jurisdictions and bear all the associated costs.

Players

- Jurisdictions $j \in \{L, H\}$, a low demander and a high demander
- Federal government f

Actions

- For the federal government, a contribution $x_f \in \mathbb{R}_+$ that represents a commitment of resources toward the implementation of a policy (e.g., immigration enforcement). Resource investment monotonically shifts policy in a certain ideological (e.g., restrictionist) direction. The federal government makes one uniform investment choice that applies to all jurisdictions; it cannot differentially target resources to specific regions.
- For each jurisdiction, a policy input $x_j \in \mathbb{R}_+$ that interacts with the federal government's choice of x_f to produce a policy output $y_j \in \mathbb{R}_+$.

Sequence of the Game

1. The federal government and local governments simultaneously make a choice of x_f and x_j for $j \in \{L, H\}$, respectively. They can all contribute any positive amount, or they can opt out and contribute nothing (no negative contributions).
2. A policy output is realized in each jurisdiction according to a production function $y_j = f(x_f, x_j)$.

Utilities

Both local and federal governments have single-peaked preferences over final policy outputs; they have ideal points $\bar{y}_f$ or $\bar{y}_j \in \mathbb{R}_+$, with $\bar{y}_L < \bar{y}_H$. Each jurisdiction cares only about its own policy (no spillovers), while the federal government wants to minimize the sum of squared deviations from its ideal point across all jurisdictions.

Utilities are given by:

$$u_j(x_j) = -\frac{1}{2}(y(x_f, x_j) - \bar{y}_j)^2 - c_j(x_j) \text{ for } j \in \{L, H\} \tag{1}$$

$$u_f(x_f) = -\frac{1}{2} \sum_{j \in \{L,H\}} (y(x_f, x_j) - \bar{y}_f)^2 - 2c_f(x_f) \tag{2}$$

where $c_j(x_j)$ and $c_f(x_f)$ are cost functions.

Baseline Model

I fix initial conditions, costs, and production functions to be the same across jurisdictions, though the model can easily accommodate varying all these features. In the baseline model, only preferences over outputs vary. I consider a simple additive linear production function:

$$y(x_f, x_j) = x_f + x_j \tag{3}$$

where local and federal inputs are pure substitutes. I further assume common linear cost functions:

$$c_j(x) = c_f(x) = cx \tag{4}$$

Then, the utilities are:

$$u_j(x_j) = -\frac{1}{2}\left(x_j + x_f - \bar{y}_j\right)^2 - cx_j \tag{5}$$

$$u_f(x_f) = -\frac{1}{2} \sum_{j \in \{L,H\}} \left(x_j + x_f - \bar{y}_f\right)^2 - 2cx_f \tag{6}$$

Nash Equilibrium

There are four (interesting) generic equilibria of the model.[1]

I. Only f contributes. This equilibrium holds when:

   i. $\bar{y}_f \geq \bar{y}_H$

   ii. $c < \bar{y}_f$

II. Only f and H contribute positive quantities, while L contributes nothing. This equilibrium holds when:

   i. $(\bar{y}_L + \bar{y}_H)/2 < \bar{y}_f < \bar{y}_H$

   ii. $\bar{y}_H < 2\bar{y}_f - c$

[1]Additional equilibria exist in which agents don't contribute only because the costs are too high; I focus on the equilibria where costs are sufficiently low relative to ideal points.

III. Only H contributes. This equilibrium holds when:

   i. $\bar{y}_H \geq 2\bar{y}_f - c$

   ii. $c < \bar{y}_H$

   iii. $c \geq \bar{y}_L$

IV. Only L and H contribute positive quantities, while f contributes nothing. This equilibrium holds when:

   i. $\bar{y}_f < (\bar{y}_L + \bar{y}_H)/2$

   ii. $c < \bar{y}_L$

   iii. $c < \bar{y}_H$

There is additionally a knife-edge equilibrium in which all three actors contribute, which holds only when the federal ideal point is exactly at the midpoint between $\bar{y}_H$ and $\bar{y}_L$.

The proceeding discussion shows that, other than this knife-edge case, there is no equilibrium in which all three players contribute (**Lemma 1**). Then it derives all other equilibria with positive contributions based on the first order conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} x_f^* &\geq \bar{y}_f - \frac{x_L + x_H}{2} - c \\ x_H^* &\geq \bar{y}_H - x_f - c \\ x_L^* &\geq \bar{y}_L - x_f - c \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

which hold with equality if the contributions are positive.

Proof of Lemma 1

Lemma 1 states that there is no generic equilibrium in which all three players contribute. To see this, first suppose that both jurisdictions are contributing positive values. Then, their optimal contributions are given by:

$$\begin{aligned} x_L^*(x_f) &= \bar{y}_L - x_f - c \\ x_H^*(x_f) &= \bar{y}_H - x_f - c \end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

Writing the federal contribution as a function of x_L and x_H,

$$x_f^* = \bar{y}_f - \frac{1}{2}\left(\bar{y}_L + \bar{y}_H - 2x_f^* - 2c\right) - c = \bar{y}_f - \frac{\bar{y}_L}{2} - \frac{\bar{y}_H}{2} + x_f^* \tag{9}$$

The only way that this equation can be satisfied is if $\bar{y}_f = \frac{\bar{y}_L + \bar{y}_H}{2}$; in that case, x_f^* can take any value. Since we need $x_L^* > 0$ and $x_H^* > 0$, there is an additional constraint on x_f^* in this knife-edge case such that $x_f^* < \bar{y}_L - c$.

Thus, the only way in which all three contribute is a continuum of equilibria satisfying the following profile:

i. x_f^* is any positive value less than $\bar{y}_L - c$

ii. $x_L^* = \bar{y}_L - x_f^* - c$

iii. $x_H^* = \bar{y}_H - x_f^* - c$

And this equilibrium holds under the condition that $\bar{y}_f = (\bar{y}_L + \bar{y}_H)/2$.

Equilibrium I: Only Federal Government Contributes

First, I consider the equilibrium in which only the federal government contributes, in which case the equilibrium contributions are given by:

$$\begin{aligned} x_f^* &= \bar{y}_f - c \\ x_L^* &= 0 \\ x_H^* &= 0 \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

This federal contribution is positive as long as $\bar{y}_f > c$. Checking the conditions under which the jurisdictions will in fact contribute nothing:

$$x_j^* \leq 0 \text{ when } \bar{y}_j - x_f^* - c \leq 0 \implies \bar{y}_j - \bar{y}_f \leq 0 \implies \bar{y}_f \geq \bar{y}_j \tag{11}$$

So as long as the federal government is the highest demander, and costs are sufficiently low, there is an equilibrium where the local governments all contribute nothing and the federal government contributes enough inputs to set policy at its ideal point, net of costs.

Equilibrium II: Federal Government and High Demander Contribute

The derivation of this equilibrium constitutes the **Proof of Proposition 1**.

Suppose the federal government and the high demander contribute positive inputs while the low demander contributes nothing. Then,

$$\begin{aligned} x_f^* &= \bar{y}_f - \frac{x_H^*}{2} - c \\ x_L^* &= 0 \\ x_H^* &= \bar{y}_H - x_f^* - c \end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

Solving for H's equilibrium contribution,

$$x_H^* = \bar{y}_H - x_f^* - c = \bar{y}_H - \bar{y}_f + \frac{x_H^*}{2} \implies x_H^* = 2(\bar{y}_H - \bar{y}_f) \tag{13}$$

This quantity is positive so long as H demands more than the federal government. Now, solving for f's equilibrium contribution,

$$x_f^* = \bar{y}_f - \frac{2(\bar{y}_H - \bar{y}_f)}{2} - c = 2\bar{y}_f - \bar{y}_H - c \tag{14}$$

So the federal government makes a positive contribution as long as $c < 2\bar{y}_f - \bar{y}_H$. Finally, checking the conditions under which jurisdiction L contributes nothing:

$$x_L^* = 0 \text{ when } \bar{y}_L - x_f^* - c < 0 \implies \bar{y}_L - 2\bar{y}_f + \bar{y}_H < 0 \implies \bar{y}_f > \frac{\bar{y}_L + \bar{y}_H}{2} \tag{15}$$

Putting all of the conditions together, this equilibrium holds when:

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{(i) } \frac{\bar{y}_L + \bar{y}_H}{2} < \bar{y}_f < \bar{y}_H \\ &\text{(ii) } \bar{y}_H < 2\bar{y}_f - c \end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

For this equilibrium to hold, we need a high-demanding jurisdiction that wants more output—but not too much more—than the federal government. This result did not rely on the assumption that $\bar{y}_L < \bar{y}_H$; rather, this ordering emerged endogenously by Condition (i). This implies that in any equilibrium in which one jurisdiction and the federal government contribute, that jurisdiction *must be* the high demander.

Equilibrium III: Only High Demander Contributes

There is a third equilibrium where only H contributes some positive quantity while L and the federal government contribute nothing. In that case,

$$\begin{aligned} x_f^* &= 0 \\ x_L^* &= 0 \\ x_H^* &= \bar{y}_H - c \end{aligned} \tag{17}$$

The high demander's contribution is positive when $c < \bar{y}_H$. Deriving the conditions under which the federal government does not contribute:

$$x_f^* = 0 \text{ when } \bar{y}_f - \frac{x_H}{2} - c \leq 0 \implies \bar{y}_f - \frac{\bar{y}_H - c}{2} - c \leq 0 \implies \bar{y}_H \geq 2\bar{y}_f - c \tag{18}$$

Finally, L does not contribute when:

$$\bar{y}_L - x_f^* - c \leq 0 \implies \bar{y}_L - c \leq 0 \implies \bar{y}_L \leq c \tag{19}$$

Thus, this third equilibrium holds under the following conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{(i) } \bar{y}_H \geq 2\bar{y}_f - c \\ &\text{(ii) } c < \bar{y}_H \\ &\text{(iii) } c \geq \bar{y}_L \end{aligned} \tag{20}$$



Equilibrium IV: Both Jurisdictions Contribute, Federal Government Does Not

Finally, there exists an equilibrium in which $x_f^* = 0$, $x_L^* > 0$, and $x_H^* > 0$. In that case,

$$\begin{aligned} x_f^* &= 0 \\ x_H^* &= \bar{y}_H - c \\ x_L^* &= \bar{y}_L - c \end{aligned} \tag{21}$$

Deriving the conditions under which this holds,[2]

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{(i) } x_f^* = 0 \text{ when } \bar{y}_f - \frac{x_L^* + x_H^*}{2} - c < 0 \implies \bar{y}_f - \frac{\bar{y}_L + \bar{y}_H}{2} < 0 \implies \bar{y}_f < \frac{\bar{y}_L + \bar{y}_H}{2} \\ &\text{(ii) } x_L^* > 0 \text{ when } c < \bar{y}_L \\ &\text{(iii) } x_H^* > 0 \text{ when } c < \bar{y}_H \end{aligned} \tag{22}$$

Thus, both jurisdictions contribute, and the federal government does not, when the federal government's ideal point falls below the two jurisdictions' midpoint.

Summary of Equilibria

In Figure A.1, I plot the four types of equilibrium as a function of $\bar{y}_f \in \{0, 2\}$ and $\bar{y}_L \in \{0, 1\}$, holding $\bar{y}_H$ fixed at 1 and c fixed at 0.5.

[2] I use a strict inequality rather than a weak one in condition (i) here because I separately consider equality with zero in the knife-edge case discussed in Lemma 1.

Figure A.1: Equilibria of the Model as a Function of $\bar{y}_L$ and $\bar{y}_f$, $\bar{y}_H = 1$ and $c = .5$



Comparing Regimes

I now compare equilibrium policy outputs under the collaborative regime examined above and a regime of central control, in which federal authorities get to set policy in every jurisdiction and pay the associated cost. First, Table A.1 summarizes the equilibrium contributions for the collaborative regime and computes the polity output, in each jurisdiction and in the aggregate, corresponding to each equilibrium.

Table A.1: Equilibrium Contributions and Output Under Collaborative Regime

Equilibrium	x_L^*	x_H^*	x_f^*	y_L^*	y_H^*	y^*
I	0	0	$\bar{y}_f - c$	$\bar{y}_f - c$	$\bar{y}_f - c$	$2\bar{y}_f - 2c$
II	0	$2(\bar{y}_H - \bar{y}_f)$	$2\bar{y}_f - \bar{y}_H - c$	$2\bar{y}_f - \bar{y}_H - c$	$\bar{y}_H - c$	$2\bar{y}_f - 2c$
III	0	$\bar{y}_H - c$	0	0	$\bar{y}_H - c$	$\bar{y}_H - c$
IV	$\bar{y}_L - c$	$\bar{y}_H - c$	0	$\bar{y}_L - c$	$\bar{y}_H - c$	$\bar{y}_L + \bar{y}_H - 2c$

Now, deriving the federal government's equilibrium contribution to every jurisdiction under central control:

$$x_f^{c*} = \max(0, \bar{y}_f - c) \tag{23}$$

With low enough costs, this leads to an output of $y_L^{c*} = y_H^{c*} = \bar{y}_f - c$, for an aggregate output of $y^{c*} = 2\bar{y}_f - 2c$.

Proof of Proposition 2

Focusing on Equilibrium II—the one that most closely describes this paper's central empirical case—we see that total output is the same under collaborative policymaking and central control. However, the collaborative regime leads to higher output in the high-demanding jurisdiction ($\bar{y}_H - c > \bar{y}_f - c$), since $\bar{y}_f < \bar{y}_H$ in this case. In the low-demanding jurisdiction, the opposite is true: $2\bar{y}_f - \bar{y}_H - c < \bar{y}_f - c$, again by the assumption that $\bar{y}_f < \bar{y}_H$.

Next, I consider how the federal government's utility under the collaborative regime compares to a regime of centralized control. In equilibrium, federal utility under central control is:

$$u_f^c(x_f^{c*}) = -(x_f^{c*} - \bar{y}_f)^2 - 2cx_f^{c*} \tag{24}$$

As before, I fix $c = .5$ and $\bar{y}_H = 1$, and I focus on the set of cases where $\bar{y}_L < .5$ in order to isolate the high demanding jurisdiction's decision to contribute (the low demander will always opt out). For each value of $\bar{y}_f \in [0, 2]$, I compute the federal government's utility under a collaborative regime (in the corresponding equilibrium) and under a regime of central control.

When calculating the federal government's utility under the collaborative regime, we have to consider three regions.

I. $\bar{y}_f \in (1, 2]$

Since only the federal government contributes in this region, its utility is the same as it would be under the central regime:

$$u_f(x_f^*) = -(x_f^* - \bar{y}_f)^2 - 2cx_f^* \tag{25}$$

where $x_f^* = \max(0, \bar{y}_f - c)$.

II. $\bar{y}_f \in (\frac{3}{4}, 1]$

$$u_f(x_f^*) = -\frac{1}{2}\left[(x_H^* + x_f^* - \bar{y}_f)^2 + (x_f^* - \bar{y}_f)^2\right] - 2cx_f^*$$

where $x_f^* = 2\bar{y}_f - \bar{y}_H - c$ and $x_H^* = 2(\bar{y}_H - \bar{y}_f)$.

III. $\bar{y}_f \in [0, \frac{3}{4}]$

$$u_f(x_f^*) = -\frac{1}{2}\left[(x_H^* - \bar{y}_f)^2 + (-\bar{y}_f)^2\right]$$

where $x_H^* = \bar{y}_H - c$.

In Figure A.2, I plot the federal government's utilities under the collaborative regime and centralized control, with $c = .5$ and $x_H^* = 1$. The regions of the graph are shaded according to the prevailing equilibrium under the collaborative regime (as in Figure A.1). As the graph shows, the federal government benefits the most from the collaborative regime compared to centralized control when its ideal point is lower than, but not too distant from, that of the high demanding jurisdiction.

Figure A.2: Federal Government's Utility as a Function of its Ideal Point, Centralized vs. Collaborative Regime; $c = .5, \bar{y}_L < .5, \bar{y}_H = 1$



Proof of Proposition 3

Finally, I compare the federal government's utility under collaborative Equilibrium II and central control, without any further assumptions on the parameter values. Under centralized control, it has a total utility of:

$$u_f^c(x_f^{c*}) = -(x_f^{c*} - \bar{y}_f)^2 - 2cx_f^{c*} = c^2 - 2\bar{y}_f c \tag{26}$$

assuming again that $\bar{y}_f > c$. Under collaborative Equilibrium II, its utility is:

$$u_f(x_f^*) = -\frac{1}{2}\left((x_f^* + x_H^* - \bar{y}_f)^2 + (x_f^* - \bar{y}_f)^2)\right) - 2cx_f^* = -(\bar{y}_H - \bar{y}_f) + c^2 - 2c\bar{y}_H - 4c\bar{y}_f \tag{27}$$

Comparing these utilities, $u_f > u_f^c$ when $\bar{y}_H - \bar{y}_f < 2c$. Put simply, the federal government is better off under the joint-policymaking regime when the high-demanding jurisdiction's preferences are above, but sufficiently close to, its own.

Extension: Federal Gatekeeping

I now consider the possibility that the federal government accepts or excludes partners for collaboration on a case-by-case basis instead of picking regimes. With two jurisdictions, the federal government has four choices:

1. Centralized regime: no collaboration
2. Low but not high demander is allowed to contribute
3. High but not low demander is allowed to contribute
4. Both high and low demanders are allowed to contribute

I have enumerated only the federal government's choice set; with each option, we also have to consider whether the federal and local governments will indeed contribute positive quantities, since all contributions remain voluntary. The analysis for options 1 and 4 proceeds much like the baseline model, since they are the same as the federal government's two choices in that setup, though we now have to compare the federal government's utilities against every alternative.

The most interesting new case to consider is option 2—excluding the high demander and allowing the low demander to contribute—since this might offer a middle ground between receiving no cost subsidy and allowing an extremist to participate. Finding an equilibrium in which the federal government chooses option 2 and then both x_L^* and x_f^* are positive follows the same steps as solving for Equilibrium II in the baseline model. Suppose the federal government and the low demander contribute positive inputs while the high demander is barred from contributing. Then,

$$\begin{aligned} x_f^* &= 2\bar{y}_f - \bar{y}_L - c \\ x_L^* &= 2(\bar{y}_L - \bar{y}_f) \\ x_H^* &= 0 \end{aligned} \tag{28}$$

Solving for the conditions under which both equilibrium contributions are positive:

$$\begin{aligned} x_L^* > 0 &\implies \bar{y}_L > \bar{y}_f \\ x_f^* > 0 &\implies 2\bar{y}_f - \bar{y}_L > c \end{aligned} \tag{29}$$

To complete the analysis, it remains to derive the conditions under which the federal government's utility from equilibrium provision under this regime exceeds its utility from equilibrium provision under the three alternatives—an exercise that is left to the interested reader. The key takeaway is that, in addition to any further restrictions, *the low-demander's ideal point must lie above the federal government's in order for the low demander to contribute positive quantities.* Consequently, despite the flexibility and plausibility gained by introducing federal gatekeeping, the model's central trade-off is reproduced once more: a higher-demanding local partner is still required to induce collaboration.

B Additional Tables and Figures

Figure B.1: Monthly Number of Detainer Requests Nationwide Over Time



Notes: This figure plots all detainer requests nationwide, aggregated by month. Dark red represents detainers that eventually resulted in a transfer to ICE custody; detainers that did not result in a transfer to ICE custody are shown in gray.

Figure B.2: Counties Constituting the Analysis Sample



Notes: The 56 counties that had a 287(g) agreement in place at any point from 2005 to 2016 and that constitute the primary analysis sample are shown in red. The 61 control counties, which applied for but were rejected from 287(g), are shown in yellow. The 101 counties that first entered the program under the Trump Administration are shown in orange.

Table B.1: Counties Included in Treatment Group in Main Analysis

State	County	Sign Date	State	County	Sign Date
AL	Etowah County	2008-07-08	NC	Gaston County	2007-02-22
AR	Benton County	2007-09-26	NC	Guilford County	2009-10-15
AR	Washington County	2007-09-26	NC	Henderson County	2008-06-25
AZ	Maricopa County	2007-02-07	NC	Mecklenburg County	2006-02-27
AZ	Pima County	2008-03-10	NC	Wake County	2008-06-25
AZ	Pinal County	2008-03-10	NH	Hillsborough County	2007-05-05
AZ	Yavapai County	2008-03-10	NJ	Hudson County	2008-08-11
CA	Los Angeles County	2005-02-01	NJ	Monmouth County	2009-10-15
CA	Orange County	2006-11-02	NJ	Morris County	2010-01-05
CA	Riverside County	2006-04-28	NV	Clark County	2008-09-08
CA	San Bernardino County	2005-10-19	OH	Butler County	2008-02-05
CO	El Paso County	2007-05-17	OK	Tulsa County	2007-08-06
CT	Fairfield County	2009-10-15	SC	Beaufort County	2008-06-25
FL	Bay County	2008-06-15	SC	Charleston County	2012-01-01
FL	Brevard County	2012-01-01	SC	Lexington County	2012-01-01
FL	Collier County	2007-08-06	SC	York County	2007-10-16
FL	Duval County	2008-07-08	TN	Davidson County	2007-02-21
FL	Manatee County	2009-01-01	TX	Collin County	2008-08-12
GA	Cobb County	2007-02-13	TX	Dallas County	2008-07-08
GA	Gwinnett County	2009-10-15	TX	Denton County	2008-08-12
GA	Hall County	2008-02-29	TX	Harris County	2008-07-20
GA	Whitfield County	2008-02-04	UT	Washington County	2008-09-22
MA	Barnstable County	2007-08-26	UT	Weber County	2008-09-22
MD	Frederick County	2008-02-06	VA	Fairfax County	2007-03-21
NC	Alamance County	2007-01-10	VA	Loudoun County	2008-06-25
NC	Cabarrus County	2007-08-02	VA	Manassas City	2008-03-05
NC	Cumberland County	2009-01-01	VA	Rockingham County	2007-04-25
NC	Durham County	2008-02-01	VA	Shenandoah County	2007-05-10

Notes: This table lists the 56 counties within which an LEA signed a 287(g) agreement for the first time at any point before the end of 2016. One county in which an agreement was signed during this period—Prince William County, VA—is omitted from the treatment group because it has no associated detainer data.

Table B.2: Counties Included in Control Group in Main Analysis

State	County	Year of Denial	State	County	Year of Denial
AL	Autauga County	2008	NC	Columbus County	2007
AL	Madison County	2005	NC	Duplin County	2007
AL	Marshall County	2008	NC	Iredell County	2007
AR	Sebastian County	2007	NC	Lee County	2007
AZ	Coconino County	2008	NC	Lincoln County	2007
AZ	Mohave County	2007	NC	New Hanover County	2007
DE	Sussex County	2007	NC	Stokes County	2007
FL	Highlands County	2008	NC	Surry County	2007
FL	Lake County	2008	NC	Union County	2007
FL	Marion County	2007	NC	Yadkin County	2007
FL	Okaloosa County	2007	NJ	Atlantic County	2010
FL	Pasco County	2008	NY	Putnam County	2007
FL	Walton County	2007	NY	Rockland County	2008
GA	Columbia County	2007	OH	Warren County	2007
GA	Forsyth County	2007	OK	Oklahoma County	2007
GA	Fulton County	2006	PA	Allegheny County	2008
GA	Oconee County	2007	PA	Bucks County	2008
IA	Marshall County	2006	PA	Carbon County	2009
IA	Wapello County	2007	SC	Berkeley County	2008
IL	DuPage County	2007	SC	Georgetown County	2010
IL	Lake County	2007	SC	Horry County	2009
IN	Allen County	2007	SC	Spartanburg County	2007
KS	Ford County	2007	TN	Bradley County	2008
KY	Boone County	2008	TN	Hamblen County	2007
LA	Lafourche Parish	2008	TN	Overton County	2008
MO	St. Charles County	2008	TN	Rutherford County	2006
NC	Alexander County	2007	TN	Williamson County	2008
NC	Brunswick County	2007	TN	Wilson County	2007
NC	Buncombe County	2007	UT	Davis County	2008
NC	Carteret County	2007	VA	Chesapeake City	2007
NC	Catawba County	2006			

Notes: This table lists the 61 counties that applied to the 287(g) program but were denied entry, as documented by Pedroza (2018). I exclude from Pedroza's list three counties that were subsequently accepted into the program: Yavapai County (AZ), Fairfax County (VA), and Rockingham County (VA).

Table B.3: Average Characteristics of Treatment and Control Counties in Year Prior to 287(g) Entry/Rejection

	Treatment	Control (Denied)	Control (Matched)
Population			
Total	834,242	$213,846^{**}$	$497,206$
Percent undocumented (county-level estimate)	4.9	2.6^{***}	3.1^{***}
Percent foreign-born	12.6	6.4^{***}	10^{**}
Percentage point change in foreign-born population, past 5 years	1.7	0.8	1.4
Immigration Enforcement Outcomes			
Detainers	148	12^{**}	132
Detainers with past criminal charge	3.8	0.3^{**}	2.3
Other County Characteristics			
Had 2006 immigration protests	0.14	0.05^{**}	0.08
Participated in Secure Communities	0.09	0.02^{**}	0.06
Democratic vote share (%), last presidential election	41.7	37.5^{**}	47.1^{**}

Notes: All characteristics are measured in the year prior to 287(g) signing for treated units, the year prior to 287(g) rejection for the first set of controls, and in the year prior to the matched treated unit's 287(g) signing for the second set of controls. Reported p-values in each control column are from a two-sided t-test between treated values and that control set. Population estimates come from the Census. County-level estimates of percent undocumented are constructed by combining state-level estimates of the size of the undocumented population from Pew with county-level estimates of the foreign-born population from the Census. Immigration enforcement outcomes come from TRAC. Coding of 2006 immigration protests and participation in Secure Communities is the author's own. Democratic vote share in the last presidential election comes from Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections. $^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$.

C Robustness Check: Matching with Difference-in-Differences

PanelMatch applies a matching step prior to a difference-in-differences analysis, refining the control set to have the most similar possible pretreatment trajectory to the treated units. Then, simple mean difference-in-differences estimates are computed for the outcomes of interest (before vs. after 287(g) entry, treated vs. control units). This estimator identifies the causal effect of 287(g) participation under the assumption that, absent the program, both treated and control units would have continued along the same pretreatment trajectories. Explicitly matching on pretreatment trends maximizes the likelihood that this identification assumption is satisfied.

To construct a matched comparison group for a county that entered 287(g) at time t, I first take the entire pool of counties that had never participated in the program up to time t, and would not do so for at least three subsequent years. Then, I implement nearest neighbor matching on total logged detainers from $t = -12$ to $t = -1$. I select the three control counties that minimize the

Mahalanobis distance to the same sequence for each treated county.[3] I additionally include two key characteristics of counties as matching covariates: their total population as well as their foreign-born population in the year of signing. The inclusion of these covariates ensures that the matched sets contain counties that are similar to one another in size and supply of potential detainers, lending more plausibility to the identification assumption.

Figure C.1: Detainers Over Time by Treatment Status, 287(g) Participants and Matched Controls



Notes: Points represent means within bins for every time period from $t = -12$ to $t = 12$ months from first 287(g) signing. Treated units, defined as those that signed a 287(g) agreement from 2005 to 2016, are shown in red, and matched control counties are shown in gray. Plotted outcome is the logged number of detainer requests in the county, aggregated by month. Loess-smoothed lines are fitted through the data on each side of $t = 0$.

[3] I select $k = 3$ after attempting $k = 3$ through $k = 6$, and finding the most similar pretreatment trends using $k = 3$.

Table C.1: Effect of 287(g) Participation on Logged Detainers, Matching with Difference-in-Differences Estimates

	t	$t+1$	$t+2$	$t+3$
Logged detainers	0.20	0.30*	0.20	0.30*
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Logged detainers, county facilities	0.80*	1.00*	1.40*	1.40*
	(0.30)	(0.40)	(0.50)	(0.60)
Logged detainers, non-county facilities	0.00	−0.10	0.30	0.40
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.30)	(0.30)

Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Estimates represent differences in mean outcomes between treated units and matched controls, and between year $t-1$ and each post-treatment year. Standard errors computed based on 1,000 weighted bootstrap samples are shown below estimates.

Table C.2: Effect of 287(g) Participation on Logged Detainers, by Prior Criminal History, Matching with Difference-in-Differences Estimates

	t	$t+1$	$t+2$	$t+3$
Logged detainers, no past criminal charge	0.80*	0.96	1.44*	1.39*
	(0.33)	(0.43)	(0.50)	(0.54)
Logged detainers, past criminal charge, misdemeanor	0.14	0.21*	0.30*	0.28*
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Logged detainers, past criminal charge, felony (low)	0.04	0.00	0.09	0.04
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Logged detainers, past criminal charge, felony (high)	0.14	0.13	0.23	0.16
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.10)

Notes: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Estimates represent differences in mean outcomes between treated units and matched controls, and between year $t-1$ and each post-treatment year. Standard errors computed based on 1,000 weighted bootstrap samples are shown below estimates.