

# Formal Approaches to Political Institutions

MIT | 17.S953 | Fall 2021 | Tues 9:00-11:00 | E53-485

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## Course Description

This course is an overview of concepts and methods in formal theory used to analyze domestic politics. It is organized thematically, according to strategic interactions and social problems that institutions may both solve and exacerbate, such as delegation, collective action, commitment, and preference aggregation. For each of these themes, we will learn some basic game theoretic modeling techniques; closely read a few formative papers; and apply our tools to the analysis of a wide range of specific problems in American politics, including questions about elections, political participation, polarization, representation, the internal organization of Congress and the bureaucracy, separation of powers, campaign finance, redistribution, public goods provision, and the legislative process. While this course on its own cannot provide all the tools students need to produce their own models, they should emerge from the semester empowered consumers of applied formal theory, with a good sense of the techniques that are available to advance their research interests.

## Prerequisites

I assume that students have taken at least one semester of graduate-level formal theory, equivalent to MIT's Game Theory and Political Theory (17.810). While a first course in American political institutions is useful, it is not essential; in fact I hope that the concepts presented here are transportable to comparative and international politics.

## Expectations and Assignments

This is primarily a discussion-based course and your regular attendance and active participation are key. The small size of the class will allow us to work through the papers and concepts in careful detail, which is more fruitful the more engaged everyone is.

Over the course of the semester, each member of the class will present three papers of their choosing to their peers. You may pick from the papers that have an asterisk next to them — these are the ones with a formal model. You will have about 30 minutes to teach the model to the rest of the class, using either slides or the board. While it's impossible to go through all the proofs in that time, I do expect the presentation to get into some level of technical detail.

The final class assignment will be a paper with an original formal model. If you want to write a paper with a formal model and an empirical test, you may hand it in with only a research design

in lieu of an empirical section; the analysis need not be done for the purposes of this assignment. The final paper will be due on **May 10th**. You are welcome but not required to submit an early draft to me for feedback by May 3rd.

Your final grade in the course will be determined as follows:

30% Presentations

30% Final paper

40% Class participation

## Reading

There are only two required books for the class:

- Scott Gehlbach, *Formal Models of Domestic Politics* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013)
- Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, *Special Interest Politics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001)

These are the best sources I know for teaching the basic modeling tools of a literature and providing an overview of its seminal papers.

After the second week, each week's reading will generally consist of three parts:

1. *Theory*: Some "textbook" reading to teach you the basic mathematical and theoretical concepts. Please devote some time to this part; while the page count is usually not large, these readings can at times be quite dense. The payoff is that they will make the papers much easier to follow. I will lecture on this material and encourage you to come to class with questions about it.
2. *Applications*: The main substance of our discussion: 4-5 important papers illustrating the game theoretic problem of the week. Those with an asterisk have a formal model. At least one of these will be presented by a student in class that week, but please be prepared to discuss them all.
3. *Suggested Reading*: Here I have included empirical or qualitative work that speaks to the assumptions or parameters of the week's models and situates them in the American political context. Please read these papers if you can; if you don't have time to read them carefully, I still expect you to be familiar with their arguments for class discussion.

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# Course Schedule

## 1 Introductions and Logistics (September 14)

## 2 What Is Rational Choice Institutionalism? (September 21)

*What do we mean by “institutions”? Do institutions “matter”? Why study institutions? Causal inference in institutional analysis.*

### Required Reading

- Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel, “Institutionalism as a Methodology,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15, no. 2 (2003): 123-144.
- William H. Riker, “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions,” *The American Political Science Review* 74, no. 2 (1980): 432-446.
  - The Diermeier and Krehbiel piece is a response to this; no need to follow the math closely here, only to understand the argument
- Adam Przeworski, “Institutions Matter?” *Government and Opposition* 39, no. 4 (2014): 527-540.
- Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Rational Choice Institutionalism,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, eds. Sarah A. Binder, R. A. W. Rhodes, and Bert A. Rockman, 2008.
- Timothy Besley and Anne Case, “Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States,” *Journal of Economic Literature* 41, no. 1 (2003): 7-73.

### 3 Theory and Empirics (September 28)

*What is a model “good for,” and what makes for a good model? How do theoretical models interact with empirics? Commensurability. Empirical implications of theoretical models. Theoretical implications of empirical models.*

#### Required Reading

##### *Theory*

- Kevin A. Clarke and David M. Primo, *A Model Discipline* (New York: Oxford University Press): 52-103.
- Scott Ashworth, Christopher R. Berry, and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, *Theory and Credibility: Integrating Theoretical and Empirical Social Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021): 1-67, 216-233.

##### *Applications*

- TIEM: <https://stephanewolton.com/about/tiem/>
- \*Scott Ashworth, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, and Amanda Friedenberg, “Learning about Voter Rationality,” *American Journal of Political Science* 62, no. 1 (2018): 37-54.
- \*Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Scott Tyson, “The Commensurability Problem: Conceptual Difficulties in Estimating the Effect of Behavior on Behavior,” *American Political Science Review* 114, no. 2 (2020): 375-391.
- \*Eggers, Andrew C., “Quality-Based Explanations of Incumbency Effects,” *The Journal of Politics* 79, no. 4 (2017): 1315-1328.

#### Suggested Reading

- Scott F Abramson, Korhan Kocak, and Asya Magazinnik, “What Do We Learn about Voter Preferences from Conjoint Experiments?” (working paper).
- Tara Slough, “On Theory and Identification: When and Why We Need Theory for Causal Identification” (working paper).
- Federica Izzo, Torun Dewan, and Stephane Wolton, “Cumulative Knowledge in the Social Sciences: The Case of Improving Voters’ Information” (working paper).
- James D. Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” *World Politics* 43 (1991): 169-195.

## 4 Voting, Elections, and Representation (October 5 - October 26)

### 4.1 The Spatial Model of Voting (October 5)

*Spatial preferences. Hotelling-Downs competition. The median voter theorem. Convergence and divergence. Competition under uncertainty. Sincere and strategic voting. Multidimensional preferences. Polarization. Measurement of ideology.*

#### Required Reading

##### *Theory*

- Grossman and Helpman, p. 41-56
- Gehlbach, Chapters 1-2

##### *Applications*

- \*Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard, “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,” *Journal of Political Economy* 89, no. 5 (1981): 914-927.
- \*Scott Ashworth and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “Electoral Selection, Strategic Challenger Entry, and the Incumbency Advantage,” *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 4 (2008): 1006-1025.
- \*Assar Lindbeck and Jorgen Weibull, “A Model of Political Equilibrium in a Representative Democracy,” *Journal of Public Economics* 51, no. 2 (1993): 195-209.
- \*Dan Bernhardt, John Duggan, and Francesco Squintani, “The Case for Responsible Parties,” *American Political Science Review* 103, no. 4 (2009): 570-587.

#### Suggested Reading

So what do American voters’ preferences look like and how do we measure them?

- Stephen Ansolabehere, Jonathan Rodden, and James M. Snyder Jr., “Purple America,” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 20, no. 2 (2006): 97-118.
- Stephen A. Jessee, “Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election,” *American Political Science Review* 103, no. 1 (2009): 59-81.
- Stephen A. Jessee, “Voter Ideology and Candidate Positioning in the 2008 Presidential Election,” *American Politics Research* 38, no. 2 (2010): 195-210.
- Douglas J. Ahler and David E. Broockman, “The Delegate Paradox: Why Polarized Politicians Can Represent Citizens Best,” *The Journal of Politics* 80, no. 4 (2018): 1117-1133.
  - An interesting consequence of multidimensional preferences
- Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006), chapters 2 and 3.

## 4.2 Candidates (October 12)

*Endogenous entry. Citizen candidate models. Office-motivated and policy-motivated candidates. Valence.*

### Required Reading

#### *Theory*

- Grossman and Helpman, p. 56-64
- Torun Dewan and Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Political Economy Models of Elections,” *The Annual Review of Political Science* 14 (2011): 311-330.
  - This piece previews the next three weeks; feel free to read the whole thing or just focus on p. 311-319 for this week; p. 319-324 for next week; and p. 324 to end for the following week.

#### *Applications*

- \*Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112, no. 1 (1997): 85-114.
- \*Tim Groseclose, “A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage,” *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 4 (2001): 862-886.
- \*Steven Callander, “Political Motivations,” *The Review of Economic Studies* 75, no. 3 (2008): 671-697.

### Suggested Reading

- Kristin Kanthak and Jonathan Woon, “Women Don’t Run? Election Aversion and Candidate Entry,” *American Journal of Political Science* 59, no. 3 (2015): 595-612.

### 4.3 Agency Models and Accountability (October 19)

*Adverse selection and moral hazard. Candidate competence. Private information. Signaling. Voter competence. Prospective and retrospective voting. Bayesian updating. Equilibrium concepts: Markov Perfect Equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.*

#### Required Reading

##### *Theory*

- Gehlbach, Chapter 7; p. 189-191 (Markov games)
- James D. Fearon, “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance,” in *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, eds. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

##### *Applications*

- \*James Alt, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, and Shanna Rose, “Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits,” *The Journal of Politics* 73, no. 1 (2011), 171-186.
- \*James M. Snyder Jr. and Michael M. Ting, “Interest Groups and the Electoral Control of Politicians,” *Journal of Public Economics* 92 (2008): 482-500.
- \*Scott Ashworth and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, “Is Voter Competence Good for Voters?: Information, Rationality, and Democratic Performance,” *American Political Science Review* 108, no. 3 (2014): 565-587.
- \*Brandice Canes-Wrone and Kenneth W. Shotts, “When Do Elections Encourage Ideological Rigidity?,” *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 2 (2007): 273-288.
- \*Sanford C. Gordon, Gregory A. Huber, and Dimitri Landa, “Challenger Entry and Voter Learning,” *American Political Science Review* 101, no. 2 (2007): 303-320.

#### Suggested Reading

How can we reconcile these findings?

- David Lee, Enrico Moretti, and Matthew Butler, “Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U.S. House,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119, no. 3 (2004): 807-860.
  - But note methodological critique: Devin Caughey and Jasjeet S. Sekhon, “Elections and the Regression Discontinuity Design: Lessons from Close U.S. House Races, 1942-2008,” *Political Analysis* 19, no. 4 (2011): 385-408.
- David Brady, Brandice Canes-Wrone, and John F. Cogan, “Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members Voting,” *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 1 (2002): 127-140



#### 4.4 Preference Aggregation and Electoral Rules (October 26)

*Elections as preference aggregation mechanisms. Condorcet Jury Theorem. Strategic voting. Electing a legislature. Proportional representation. At-large vs. single-member districts. Electoral geography. Minority representation.*

##### Required Reading

###### *Theory*

- Grossman and Helpman, p. 64-73
- Shepsle, p. 191-225
- Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, “Elections, Information Aggregation, and Strategic Voting,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 96, no. 19 (1999): 10572-10574.

###### *Applications*

- \*Torben Iversen and David Soskice, “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others,” *American Political Science Review* 100, no. 2 (2006): 165-181.
- \*Alessandro Lizzeri and Niccolo Persico, “The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives,” *American Economic Review* 91, no. 1 (2001): 225-239.
- \*Roger B. Myerson, “Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems,” *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 4 (1993): 856-869.
- \*Gary W. Cox, “Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions,” *American Journal of Political Science* 31, no. 1 (1987): 82-108.
- Jonathan Rodden, “The Geographic Distribution of Political Preferences,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 13 (2010): 321-40.

##### Suggested Reading

- Jonathan Rodden, *Why Cities Lose* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2019).
- Jessica Trounstein and Melody E. Valdini, “The Context Matters: The Effects of Single-Member versus At-Large Districts on City Council Diversity,” *American Journal of Political Science* 52, no. 3 (2008): 554-569.

## 5 Delegation (November 2)

*Principal-agent theory. Bureaucratic drift. Neutral competence. The ally principle.*

### Required Reading

#### *Theory*

- Gehlbach, Chapter 5
- J. Bendor, A. Glazer, and T. Hammond, “Theories of Delegation,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 235-269.
- Jean Tirole, “The Internal Organization of Government,” *Oxford Economic Papers* 46, no. 1 (1994): 1-29.

#### *Applications*

- \*Sean Gailmard and John Patty, “Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise,” *American Journal of Political Science* 51, no. 4 (2007): 873-889.
- \*John D. Huber and Nolan McCarty, “Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform,” *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 3 (2004): 481-494.
- \*Kenneth Lowande, “Politicization and Responsiveness in Executive Agencies,” *The Journal of Politics* 81, no. 1 (2018): 33-48.
- \*Michael M. Ting, “Whistleblowing,” *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 2 (2008): 249-267.
- Sanford C. Gordon, “Politicizing Agency Spending Authority: Lessons from a Bush-era Scandal,” *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 4 (2011): 717-734.

### Suggested Reading

- Sean Gailmard and John Patty, *Learning While Governing: Expertise and Accountability in the Executive Branch* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2013).
- Rachel Potter, *Bending the Rules: Procedural Politicking in the Bureaucracy* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2019).

## 6 Special Interest Politics (November 9 - November 16)

### 6.1 Collective Action and Information (November 9)

*Logic of collective action. Why do people engage in costly political action? How do groups exercise influence on government beyond voting? (Note: we focus this week on information; money in politics will receive its own treatment next week.) Common agency. Signaling. Information revelation. Mechanism design. Bayesian games. Government responsiveness to interest groups.*

#### Required Reading

##### *Theory*

- Grossman and Helpman, p. 101-184

##### *Applications*

- \*Susanne Lohmann, “A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action,” *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 2 (1993): 319-333.
- \*Avinash Dixit, Gene M. Grossman, and Elhanan Helpman, “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making,” *The Journal of Political Economy* 104, no. 4 (752-769).
- \*Vijay Krishna and John Morgan, “A Model of Expertise,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 116, no. 2 (2001): 747-775.
- Sarah F. Anzia, “When Does a Group of Citizens Influence Policy? Evidence from Senior Citizen Participation in City Politics,” *The Journal of Politics* 81, no. 1 (2018): 1-14.

#### Suggested Reading

- Sarah F. Anzia, “The Election Timing Effect: Evidence from a Policy Intervention in Texas,” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 7 (2012): 209-248.
- Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (New York, NY: Schocken Books, 1965), chapters 1 and 2.

## 6.2 Buying Influence (November 16)

*We extend all of the concepts from the previous week and introduce money.*

### Required Reading

#### *Theory*

- Grossman and Helpman, p. 223-345
- Gehlbach, Chapter 3

#### *Applications*

- \*Susanne Lohmann, “Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying,” *Public Choice* 85 (1995): 267-284.
- \*Andrea Prat, “Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies,” *Journal of Economic Theory* 103 (2002): 162-189.
- \*Scott Ashworth, “Campaign Finance and Voter Welfare with Entrenched Incumbents,” *American Political Science Review* 100, no. 1 (2006): 55-68.
- Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder Jr., “Why Is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?,” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 1 (2003): 105-130.
- Michael J. Barber, Brandice Canes-Wrone, and Sharece Thrower, “Ideologically Sophisticated Donors: Which Candidates Do Individual Contributors Finance?,” *American Journal of Political Science* 61, no. 2 (2017): 271-288.

## 7 Collective Decisionmaking (November 23 - November 30)

### 7.1 Agenda Control, Veto Players, and Procedural Rules (November 23)

*Back to spatial preferences. Setting the agenda. Pivotal politics. Veto bargaining. Separation of powers. Gridlock. The case space framework.*

#### Required Reading

##### *Theory*

- Gehlbach, Chapter 4
- Charles M. Cameron and Nolan McCarty, “Models of Vetoes and Veto Bargaining,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 7 (2004): 409-435.

##### *Applications*

- Keith Krehbiel, *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), chapters 1 and 2.
- \*Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal, “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo,” *Public Choice* 33 (1978): 27-43.
- \*Thomas W. Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel, “Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature,” *American Journal of Political Science* 34, no. 2 (1990): 531-564.
- \*Jeffrey R. Lax and Charles M. Cameron, “Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court,” *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 23, no. 2 (2007): 276-302.

#### Suggested Reading

- Gary W. Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins, *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- Charles M. Cameron, *Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
- William G. Howell, *Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).

## 7.2 Legislative Bargaining and Distributive Politics (November 30)

*Divide the dollar. Bargaining with an audience. Proposal power. Minimum winning coalitions. Applications to congressional committees and pork-barrel spending. Vote buying revisited.*

### Required Reading

#### *Theory*

- Gehlbach, Chapter 6

#### *Applications*

- \*David P. Baron and John A. Ferejohn, “Bargaining in Legislatures,” *American Political Science Review* 83, no. 4 (1989): 1181-1206.
- Daniel Diermeier and Rebecca Morton, “Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining,” in *Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honour of Jeffrey S. Banks*, eds. David Austen-Smith and John Duggan (New York, NY: Springer, 2005), 201-226.
  - Testing Baron-Ferejohn in the lab
- \*Tim Groseclose and Nolan McCarty, “The Politics of Blame: Bargaining before an Audience,” *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (2001), 100-119.
- \*Tim Groseclose and James M. Snyder Jr., “Buying Supermajorities,” *American Political Science Review* 90, no. 2 (1996): 303-315.

### Suggested Reading

Empirical evidence on Congressional committee assignments, including interaction with ideology:

- Christopher R. Berry and Anthony Fowler, “Cardinals or Clerics? Congressional Committees and the Distribution of Pork,” *American Journal of Political Science* 60, no. 3 (2016): 692-708.
  - But note methodological critique: Ben Hammond and Leah Rosenstiel, “Measuring the Influence of Political Actors on the Federal Budget,” *American Political Science Review* forthcoming.
- Justin Grimmer and Eleanor Neff Powell, “Congressmen in Exile: The Politics and Consequences of Involuntary Committee Removal,” *The Journal of Politics* 75, no. 4 (2013): 907-920.
- Dan Alexander, Christopher R. Berry, and William G. Howell, “Distributive Politics and Legislator Ideology,” *The Journal of Politics* 78, no. 1 (2016): 214-231.

## 8 Commitment/Dynamic Inconsistency (December 6)

*Intertemporal commitment problems. Constitutions. What is required to sustain reform. Bureaucratic autonomy.*

### Required Reading

#### *Theory*

- Jon Elster, “Ulysses Unbound: Constitutions as Constraints,” in *Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 88-167.
- Kenneth Shepsle, “Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem of Government Commitment,” in *Social Theory for a Changing Society*, eds. P. Bordieu and J. Coleman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991): 245-263.

#### *Applications*

- \*Phillip Aghion and Jean Tirole, “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,” *Journal of Political Economy* 105 (1997): 1-29.
- \*Roger Myerson, “The Autocrat’s Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State,” *American Political Science Review* 102, no. 1 (2008): 125-139.

### Suggested Reading

- Barry Weingast and William Marshall, “The Industrial Organization of Congress: Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets,” *Journal of Political Economy* 96, no. 1 (1988): 132-163.
- Eric M. Patashnik, *Reforms at Risk: What Happens After Major Policy Changes Are Enacted* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), chapters XX.
- Daniel P. Carpenter, *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 1-36.

## 9 Additional Topics

### 9.1 Cooperation, Collective Action, and Public Goods

- Shepsle, Chapter 3
- Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
- \*Christopher R. Berry, *Imperfect Union: Representation and Taxation in Multilevel Governments* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
- \*Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, “Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: A Political Economy Approach,” *Journal of Public Economics* 87 (2003): 2611-2637.

### 9.2 Endogenous Institutions and Institutional Change

- Avner Greif and David Laitin, “A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change,” *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 4 (2004): 14-48.
- James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change,” in James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds., *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

### 9.3 Path Dependence

- Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 2 (2000): 251-267.



## References

- Aghion, Philippe, and Jean Tirole. 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations." *The Journal of Political Economy* 105(1).
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- Bendor, J., A. Glazer, and T. Hammond. 2001. "Theories of Delegation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4(1): 235–269.
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- Berry, Christopher R., and Anthony Fowler. 2016. "Cardinals or Clerics? Congressional Committees and the Distribution of Pork." *American Journal of Political Science* 60(3): 692–708.

- Besley, Timothy, and Anne Case. 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States." *Journal of Economic Literature* 41(1): 7–73.
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- Besley, Timothy, and Stephen Coate. 2003. "Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: A Political Economy Approach." *Journal of Public Economics* 87(12): 2611–2637.
- Callander, Steven. 2008. "Political Motivations." *Review of Economic Studies* 75(3): 671–697.
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